We use data on French budgeting to test models of friction, incrementalism, and punctuated equilibrium. Data include the overall state budget since 1820; French budgets by ministry since 1868; and three categories of spending in 91 large French cities for the period since 1977. In every case we show the signature leptokurtic distribution that Jones and Baumgartner demonstrated in US budgeting processes. This suggests that general characteristics of administrative processes create friction, and that these general factors are more important than particular details of organizational design. The legendary centralization and administrative strength of the French state, especially when compared to the decentralized, federalized, and separated powers system of the US system, where the theory was developed, apparently is not sufficient to overcome pressures causing the build-up of friction. Further, our French data cover a wide range of institutional procedures and constitutional regimes in place in France over the period studied. The similarity of our findings across all these settings suggests that administrative structures alone are less important than the cognitive reasons discussed in the original model.
Punctuated Equilibrium in French Budgeting Processes Introduction
There are two possible reasons for punctuated equilibrium (PE) findings in the distribution of the sizes of changes in annual budgets: Institutional friction and cognitive overload. In this paper we investigate government spending in France and present strong evidence that the cognitive explanation is more powerful than the institutional one. We look at the history of French state spending since 1820; these data show the signature pattern of high kurtosis that is characteristic of a PE process. Next we explore spending in ten different government ministries since 1868; we find similar results. Finally, we look at municipal spending across three budget categories for 91 large French cities from 1977 to 2002; again we find a similar pattern.
The US system of weak parties, separation of powers, federalism, and the shared powers of the legislative and executive branches in the realm of budgeting make it simple to understand the high institutional costs of decision-making there. That system was designed to require concurrent majorities that may often be absent; without them the status-quo policy remains until pressure builds sufficiently to break the logjam. Thus the model of heavy institutional friction that Jones and Baumgartner (2005) laid out is easily understandable in the US context. But the French system was designed with entirely different goals in mind. Many of the ideas in the agenda-setting and PE literatures appear foreign and perhaps irrelevant in the parliamentary context, at least on the surface: Venue-shopping is more limited, elite civil service corps play a more important role, the executive branch has much greater say in budgeting, and parties ensure a consistency in government policy that one does not expect in the US. France has all these characteristics quite powerfully; indeed the constitutional structure of the Fifth Republic was specifically designed to ensure executive dominance and autonomy. France therefore represents a polar opposite case from the US, where the findings of PE in budgeting were first reported.
We take advantage of these substantial differences to lay out a strong test of the theory.
First of all, does France exhibit spending patterns characteristic of a PE process? Since the theory was developed and the first findings came from the US with its exceptional institutional design, there is no a priori reason why it must exist at all in another specific institutional framework such as that of France. Second, we take advantage of the many different data series we have that include an overview of almost 200 years of French history, a more detailed look at 130 years, and finally the last 25 years of municipal spending. If we find substantial differences across historical periods, by levels of aggregation, or from the central state to the local level, then we can investigate further the institutional differences that account for this variation. Our findings are that there is substantial evidence of PE processes no matter where we look. Finding such strong evidence across many historical periods, with different data sources and at the local as well as the national levels is powerful testimony to the generalizability of the PE finding and to the idea that its most important driving force is the architecture of human cognition rather than any particular institutional feature of governments.
The core issue we address is very simple: No matter what the institutional design, all modern governments face a dizzying array of thousands of real and potential problems. The complexity of the tasks governments are asked to take on is so great that proportionate response to all the various problems is impossible. In sum, findings of high kurtosis in the French data similar to what has been found in the US would suggest that these cannot be caused by any differences in institutional design between the two countries, but must be related to a similarity:
The overwhelming complexity of the issues of public policy with which all governments deal.
Budgetary Incrementalism, Punctuated Equilibrium, and Empirical Analysis
While the US and the French institutional structures and budgeting processes are starkly different, both systems must deal with an ever-changing mix of social, economic, political, and international issues constantly rising and falling in intensity at different rates. US congressional committees hold thousands of hearings each year on hundreds of different topics and executive branch officials simultaneously implement policies ranging from farm subsidies to large-scale war. Similarly French civil servants operate policies in hundreds of different areas covering the full range of activities from delivering the mail to space research and genomic mapping. There are no simple gauges to tell decision-makers which problems are most severe, which concerns affect the public the most, or which have the greatest chance of being solved. Rather, in both systems, there are never-ending debates about these very questions. Jones and Baumgartner (2005) laid out the reasons why, through a process of "attention-shifting," we should expect individuals and governments alike, when dealing with such complex environments, to distribute their attention in fits and starts.
Most issues, most of the time, are treated within the realm of specialized policy communities and operate well below the "radar screen" of the political leadership. With little attention to them, policy at Time t is largely determined by adherence to the status quo, or the policy at that had been adopted Time t-1 (often itself a simple re-affirmation of a previous policy).
But when major problems arise within that issue-area then higher level attention may be called for. The very emergence of the issue as a "new" problem (or a newly severe one) may imply that the previously chosen solutions did not work, or perhaps even that the previous understanding of the nature of the problem itself was faulty. Through these mechanisms, issues selected for attention are often the objects of significant changes in policy outputs but the vast bulk of issues at any given time are carried on with great deference to the status quo. Policy tomorrow may differ quite dramatically from the policy of yesterday in those few areas that pass a threshold of urgency and attention, but the vast bulk of the issues are simply carried forward with minimal adjustment from the previous period. This model of "hyper-incrementalism" combined with punctuations is at the heart of the Jones and Baumgartner model of PE. The model allows for very simple tests based on analyses of the entire distribution of changes in annual policy outputs such as budgets as we will do here.
Jones and Baumgartner laid out the reasons why, through the Central Limit Theorem, we would expect that the distribution of annual changes in the severity of thousands of social indicators affecting the government budget will be distributed Normally. Since there are thousands of economic, social, and stochastic inputs that affect government programs and no single process determines any more than a few of them together, their combination must mathematically be distributed Normally, at least in annual percent changes, as we analyze here.
If changes in the severity of the social inputs are distributed Normally and government is reacting to these changes proportionately, then we should see a perfect illustration of incrementalism: Annual changes in budgets should also be Normally distributed. If there is a model of PE, on the other hand, with significant institutional or cognitive friction, then the distribution of budget changes will not be Normal but will have a high kurtosis value, even if the underlying social inputs are Normal. So we have a very simple test that can be applied to any consistently-defined series of policy outputs.
Budgeting Processes in France
We present data here on French budgeting back to 1820, a period during which French constitutional structures and budgetary procedures changed many times, sometimes violently.
Our data begin with the budgets of the Restauration period (1815-1830), and continue through the Monarchy of July (1831-1847), Second Empire (1851-1870), Third Republic (1871 Republic ( -1939 , Vichy (1940-44) , the Fourth Republic (1945) (1946) (1947) (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) , and the Fifth Republic (1958-) . The period includes several wars, foreign occupations and a set of constitutional regimes ranging from Monarchy and Empire to either parliamentary-centered democracy or the current executivecentered democracy. We present more detailed information about specific ministerial budgets from 1868, also covering several different constitutional regimes. Finally, we show data on municipal spending in 91 large French cities from 1977, all within the current 5 th Republic.
Over the period of our study, a wide range of constitutional and administrative procedures affected the budgetary process in France. These have varied substantially over time and differ between the central and local levels (for detailed descriptions of French budgetary processes see Adam, Ferrand, and Rioux 2003; Isaia and Spindler, 1986; Kott, 2004 ; Le Guen, Message, and Tessier, 1988; Sine 2006; Théret, 1995 
Data and Results
We compare it with a Normal distribution. Given the obvious importance of war and constitutional instability in France, we also want to be certain that any dramatic budgetary shifts we do observe are not solely related to these causes, and we do so below. Figure 2 presents the same data as in to the Normal, there are more cases in the peak, fewer in the "shoulders," and many more outliers. We can provide more evidence about the PE nature of budgeting in France by looking in more detail at individual ministerial series, though these are not available for as many years. We were able to gather detailed ministerial-level spending data for ten different ministries, as described in Table 1 . We have seven series beginning in or around 1868 and ten series for the post-1947 period.
(Insert Table 1 about here)
We have been careful to adjust these series for the inevitable problems of shifting ministerial portfolios including in our calculations only those annual changes based on the identical baseline; that is, we deleted cases where substantial reorganizations of ministerial boundaries occurred. We can confidently compare budgetary changes for the remaining data to see if these detailed series present a similar pattern to that shown in Figure 2 . course, but we excluded it because it is not the object of any annual decision-making process, but rather reflects the accumulation of decisions made in many previous years.) We therefore limited our analysis to the series in which we had the greatest confidence and which reflect annual decisions. Figure 4 , based on over 6,600 observations, shows our results. Total spending is the closest we have observed to Normal, with a kurtosis value of less than seven. Personnel expenses are extremely punctuated and entirely account for the unusual "second" peak which is clearly visible in Figure 4 . We expect to explore this feature in later studies. Infrastructure spending is also highly punctuated. Total expenses show almost a
Normal shape with the exception of too many cases far out in the right extreme. In any case, our brief analysis of spending at the municipal level shows that spending are highly punctuated but also raise interesting questions for further analysis about the characteristics that may accentuate or attenuate these tendencies.
Together, the data we have presented make clear that French budgets are highly punctuated. Figure 1 may make one wonder, however, if perhaps those large changes occurred only during times of war or instability. If this were the case then the theory would not be supported because the causes of punctuations would be stochastic shocks rather than the normal functioning of government procedures and cognitive architectures as Jones and Baumgartner (2005) suppose. We can approach this question in several ways. First, we can estimate kurtosis values for the entire series and then again while eliminating war years. Second, we can look at different constitutional regimes to see if they differed significantly from each other. After all, the 5 th Republic has been free of such crises and our municipal data series reflect only local spending, not military mobilizations (absent in any case during the 1977-2002 period as well). Table 2 shows a statistical summary of our data broken down in this way. (The table also shows our municipal data individually by series and grouped as presented in Figure 4 .) (Insert Table 2 about here) Table 2 shows some large differences in budgeting patterns across the different series we have explored, but each and every series exhibits substantial kurtosis. As was clear from Further, as in the US case, extremely large wars are indeed the cause of some of the punctuations and therefore inflate the kurtosis scores somewhat. However, when we look at French budgets excluding war years or when we look at only the 5 th Republic, or when we look at municipal spending during a period with no war, we see that high kurtosis values remain. War is only a small part of the story.
The different kurtosis values presented in Table 2 make clear that a wide range of outcomes can occur even within a single system. We expect to explore these differences in greater detail in the future. For the purpose of this paper, however, the fundamental point is that every one of the series we have investigated, across all the periods studied, deviates from the Normal distribution. Levels of punctuation differ by constitutional regime, historical period, and between periods of war and peace, certainly. But no matter which regime, period, state of war, or even level of government, we consistently see that every budget series is highly punctuated.
Conclusion
We explored French budgeting processes here and showed that all levels of budgeting, across all historical periods from 1820 to present exhibit the characteristics we expect to see in a PE process based on a friction model. Institutional variation clearly plays a substantial role in these processes as well, of course, and we have shown substantial variation in the levels of friction across different parts of our study. We will explore those in greater detail in the future. For now, we are left with a simple observation: The legendary centralization of the French state was designed to emphasize Cartesian rationality, in perfect contrast to the separation of powers system in the United States.
In the French view, powerful civil servants in the Ministry of Finance, working for the democratically elected Government, should have authority over the entire budget. The goal of comprehensive rationality remains elusive, however. Instead, we see the same general pattern of adherence to the status quo until forced to make dramatic adjustments. These are certainly general characteristics of government in the face of overwhelming complexity. Institutional procedures may minimize or exacerbate them, but they cannot make them go away. 
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